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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(Civil Action No. 1-15-cv-00537) 
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
________________ 
 
Argued September 27, 2017 
 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE, Circuit Judges,  
and CONTI, * Chief District Judge 
                                                 
*  Honorable Joy Flowers Conti, Chief Judge of the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
___________ 
 
CONTI, Chief District Judge  
 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d), a district 
court may order a plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses an action 
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and files a second action against the same defendant based 
upon a claim asserted in the first action to pay the “costs” 
incurred by the defendant in the first action. The issue 
presented (one of first impression in this Court) is whether a 
district court may award attorneys’ fees as “costs” under Rule 
41(d). We conclude that attorneys’ fees may only be awarded 
as “costs” under Rule 41(d) when the substantive statute under 
which the lawsuit was filed defines costs to include attorneys’ 
fees. Because no such statute is involved here, and no other 
basis upon which attorneys’ fees may be awarded was properly 
raised with the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware,1 we will affirm the decision of the District Court 
denying the request for attorneys’ fees.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. The lawsuit filed in the Southern District 
of New York 
 
On July 29, 2014, the estate of Mexican national Hans 
Jorg Schneider Sauter (the “Estate”) filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York2 against Citigroup Inc. (“Citigroup”), El Banco Nacional 
De Mexico S.A. (“Banamex”) and Banamex U.S.A. The 
                                                 
1  We will refer to the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware, which is the court from which this appeal 
arises, as the “District Court.”  
 
2  We will refer to the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York as the “New York District 
Court.” 
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complaint contained various claims,3 and the Estate requested, 
among other things, the following relief: “That the Court order 
Citibank, Banamex, and Banamex USA to turn over 
information pertaining to all accounts of Hans Jorg Schneider 
Sauter immediately….” (S.D.N.Y. Civ. Action No. 14-5812 
(ECF No. 1 at 13).) 
 
 The Estate filed an amended complaint that added 
Grupo Financiero Banamex, S.A. De C.V. (“Grupo 
Financiero”) as a defendant and added a claim for “Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (‘RICO’) 
Infractions, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.” (S.D.N.Y. Civ. Action 
No. 14-5812 (ECF No. 13 at 1, 21).) Citigroup, Banamex, 
Banamex U.S.A., and Grupo Financiero filed a motion to 
dismiss the amended complaint. The Estate did not respond to 
that motion; rather, on November 10, 2014, it filed a motion to 
amend/correct the amended complaint.  
 
 The New York District Court held a hearing, denied the 
Estate’s motion to amend/correct the amended complaint, and 
ordered the Estate to advise whether it intended to withdraw 
any of the claims in the amended complaint. On December 12, 
2014, the Estate filed a notice of voluntary withdrawal 
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i).  
                                                 
3  The original complaint filed in the Southern District of 
New York contained the following claims for relief: (1) 
“Fraudulent Conversion in Defiance of Court Orders That 
Justifies Piercing the Corporate Veil against Citigroup and 
Other Defendants[;]” (2) “Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350[;]” (3) “The Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 
U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010[;]” and (4) “New York State Law for 
Enforcement of Money Judgments, N.Y. CLS CPLR 
§ 5201[.]” (S.D.N.Y. Civ. Action No. 14-5812 (ECF No. 1 at 
10, 12, 13).) 
5 
 
 The Estate’s current counsel entered her appearance on 
behalf of the Estate in substitution for its former counsel. 
Citigroup, Banamex, Banamex U.S.A., and Grupo Financiero 
filed a motion to vacate the notice of voluntary dismissal and 
to dismiss the case with prejudice. They also requested 
sanctions against the Estate pursuant to: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 
which allows a court to tax excess costs to an attorney who 
“multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and 
vexatiously[,]” 28 U.S.C. § 1927; and (ii) the court’s “inherent 
powers to impose sanctions as a deterrent against continued 
vexatious litigation[,]” (S.D.N.Y. Civ. Action No. 14-5812 
(ECF No. 63 at 2)). The Estate filed a declaration from its 
former counsel in which he averred that he represented the 
Estate because he was asked to do so by a “long-time friend[,]” 
and that litigation “had not been a major focus of…[his] 
practice.” (S.D.N.Y. Civ. Action No. 14-5812 (ECF No. 72 
¶¶ 1, 2).)  
 
The motion to vacate was denied and the notice of 
voluntary dismissal was held to be valid. The request for 
sanctions was denied because the Estate’s conduct did “not rise 
to the level of bad faith.” Estate of Sauter v. Citigroup, Inc., 
No. 14 Civ. 05812, 2015 WL 3429112, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 
27, 2015). The New York District Court explained:  
 
[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide 
safeguards for Defendants if Plaintiff does 
commence a second action, including by barring 
Plaintiff from voluntarily dismissing the case 
without prejudice a second time and by 
permitting the court in the subsequent action to 
order Plaintiff to pay all of Defendants’ costs and 
fees in this dismissed action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
41(a)(1)(B), (d). 
 
Id. at *5. 
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B. The Lawsuit Filed in the District of 
Delaware 
 
On June 25, 2015, the Estate filed a complaint in the 
District Court. The Estate named only Citigroup in the 
complaint and asserted a state-law demand for “an accounting 
of any and all funds deposited and withdrawn from bank 
accounts of a now-deceased man named Hans Jorg Schneider 
Sauter.”  (D. Del. Civ. Action No. 15-537 (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1).) 
 
Citigroup filed a motion for costs and a stay pursuant to 
Rule 41(d). Citigroup asserted it was entitled to the costs, 
including attorneys’ fees, it incurred in defending the lawsuit 
filed in the Southern District of New York because the Estate 
voluntarily dismissed that action and then filed a complaint 
asserting a similar, if not identical, claim for relief in the 
District of Delaware.  
 
The District Court granted the motion for costs and a 
stay, but concluded that because the plain language of Rule 
41(d) does not provide for an award of attorneys’ fees, 
Citigroup could not be awarded attorneys’ fees as costs under 
the rule. It granted a stay of the proceedings pending the Estate 
paying the costs to Citigroup. The District Court later lifted the 
stay and the litigation continued.  
 
Citigroup filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
The District Court granted that motion and denied the Estate 
leave to amend. The Estate filed a motion for reconsideration, 
which was denied. The Estate appealed those orders, which we 
will affirm in an opinion and judgment issued separately from 
this opinion. 
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Citigroup timely cross-appealed the denial of its request 
for attorneys’ fees as “costs” under Rule 41(d). That appeal is 
the subject of this Opinion. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
 The District Court’s diversity jurisdiction originated 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have appellate jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s interpretation 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is a legal issue, 
de novo. EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 264 
(3d Cir. 2010).  
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Whether costs awarded under Rule 41(d) 
may include attorneys’ fees  
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d), when a 
plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed a case, and later files a case 
with the same claim against the same defendant, the district 
court in the later action may order the plaintiff to pay of the 
“costs” of the voluntarily dismissed case.4 Neither the rule nor 
                                                 
4 The rule provides: 
Rule 41. Dismissal of Action 
… 
(d) Costs of a Previously Dismissed Action. If 
a plaintiff who previously dismissed an action in 
any court files an action based on or including 
the same claim against the same defendant, the 
court: 
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the Advisory Committee Notes define the term “costs.” 
Citigroup appeals the decision of the District Court declining 
to award it attorneys’ fees as costs under Rule 41(d). Our sister 
Courts of Appeals that have analyzed whether attorneys’ fees 
may be awarded as costs under Rule 41(d) have arrived at three 
different conclusions about how the rule should be interpreted: 
(1) attorneys’ fees may always be awarded as costs under Rule 
41(d), Evans v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 623 F.2d 121, 122 (8th 
Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (the “Always Awardable 
Interpretation”); (2) attorneys’ fees may never be awarded as 
costs under Rule 41(d), Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 230 
F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2000) (the “Never Awardable 
Interpretation”); and (3) attorneys’ fees may be awarded as 
costs under Rule 41(d) only where the underlying substantive 
statute defines “costs” to include attorneys’ fees, Andrews v. 
Am.’s Living Ctrs., LLC, 827 F.3d 306, 310 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Esposito v. Piatrowski, 223 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 
2000)) (the “Underlying Substantive Statute Interpretation”). 
We will examine each interpretation to determine which will 
be adopted by our Court.  
1. The Always Awardable Interpretation 
Citigroup advocates that attorneys’ fees may always be 
awarded as costs under Rule 41(d) and cites the decision of the 
Eight Circuit Court of Appeals in Evans to support its position. 
The interpretation of Rule 41(d) in Evans, however, runs afoul 
                                                 
(1) may order the plaintiff to pay all or 
part of the costs of that previous action; 
and 
(2) may stay the proceedings until the 
 plaintiff has complied. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(d).  
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of the “‘bedrock principle known as the American Rule…[that] 
[e]ach litigant pays its own attorneys’ fees[.]’” Baker Botts 
L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) 
(quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 
242, 252-53 (2010)). Before a court can shift a party’s legal 
fees to another party, it must find a reason to depart from this 
bedrock rule.  Id. (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. 
v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 
(2001)). The plain text of Rule 41(d) does not define “costs” to 
include attorneys’ fees and the Advisory Committee Notes are 
silent with respect to the issue. The court in Evans did not point 
to any express authorization by Congress to provide for an 
award of attorneys’ fees under Rule 41(d) or otherwise explain 
its decision to affirm the district court’s award of attorneys’ 
fees under the rule.  
 
Citigroup relies upon the purpose of Rule 41(d) to 
convince us to provide an exception to the American Rule in 
this case. The purpose of awarding costs to a defendant in the 
circumstances described by Rule 41 is “to deter forum 
shopping and vexatious litigation.”  Esposito, 223 F.3d at 501 
(citing Simone v. First Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 971 F.2d 103, 108 
(8th Cir. 1992)); see Andrews, 827 F.3d at 309. The rule 
prevents a plaintiff from “‘gain[ing] any tactical advantage by 
dismissing and refiling’” the lawsuit. Rogers, 230 F.3d at 874 
(quoting Sewell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 137 F.R.D. 28, 29 
(D. Kan. 1991)). Citigroup argues that Rule 41(d) “costs” 
should include attorneys’ fees in all cases, without regard to 
the underlying substantive statute, because otherwise the 
deterrent effect of the rule would be thwarted. In other words, 
a plaintiff should never be off the hook for the bulk of the 
expenses incurred by a defendant. The Supreme Court, 
however, explained in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. 
Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975), that courts are 
not permitted to engage in this policymaking exercise. It 
rejected a similar attempt to craft judicially an exception to the 
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American Rule based upon public policy because only 
Congress “has the power and judgment to pick and choose 
among statutes and to allow attorneys’ fees under some, but not 
others.” Id. at 263–64, 269.  
Nothing in the text of Rule 41(d) can be construed as an 
express authorization for a district court to award attorneys’ 
fees. We lack the authority “to jettison the traditional rule 
against nonstatutory allowances to the prevailing party and to 
award attorneys' fees whenever the courts deem the public 
policy furthered by a particular statute important enough to 
warrant the award.” Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 263. We are not 
persuaded that Citigroup’s policy arguments give us the 
authority to hold that attorneys’ fees are always awardable as 
costs under Rule 41(d). Thus, we must reject an interpretation 
of Rule 41(d) that permits attorneys’ fees to always be 
awardable as costs under the rule.  
2. The Never Awardable Interpretation 
The District Court relied upon the interpretation of Rule 
41(d) by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rogers to 
conclude that Citigroup was not entitled to attorneys’ fees as 
costs in this case because the plain text of Rule 41(d) does not 
provide for an award of costs. We decline to follow this 
interpretation of the rule because the Supreme Court of the 
United States has recognized that “costs” is an ambiguous term 
subject to “varying definitions.” Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 
8 (1985). The drafters of Rule 41 chose to leave the term 
“costs” undefined in both the rule and the Advisory Committee 
Notes, making no reference to attorneys’ fees. While we will 
affirm the decision of the District Court to deny Citigroup’s 
request for attorneys’ fees, the analysis undertaken by the 
District Court was incomplete. An analysis beyond the plain 
language of Rule 41(d) is required to determine whether 
Congress intended for “costs” to include attorneys’ fees under 
the rule. 
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3. The Underlying Substantive Statute 
Interpretation 
We find most persuasive the interpretation of Rule 
41(d) set forth by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Esposito and followed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Andrews. Those courts relied upon Marek to conclude that 
“attorneys’ fees are not generally awardable under Rule 41(d) 
‘unless the substantive statute which formed the basis of the 
original suit allows for the recovery of such fees as costs (or 
unless such fees are specifically ordered by the court).’” 
Andrews, 827 F.3d at 310 (quoting Esposito, 223 F.3d at 501). 
In Marek, the Supreme Court addressed whether attorneys’ 
fees are awardable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, 
which allows for the imposition of “costs” when a plaintiff 
rejects a settlement offer that turns out to be greater than the 
ultimate judgment at trial. Marek, 473 U.S. at 4, 8; FED. R. CIV. 
P. 68. As with Rule 41(d), the drafters of Rule 68 neither 
defined the term “costs” nor explained its intended meaning, 
and made no reference to attorneys’ fees. Marek, 473 U.S. at 
8-9. After examining the plain text of Rule 68, the Court 
concluded legal fees may be awarded under Rule 68, but only 
where expressly authorized by some applicable statute or other 
authority. Id. at 9. This holding recognized the continued 
vitality of the American Rule and reaffirmed that there must be 
statutory authority or other authority to award attorneys’ fees. 
 
Marek built upon the Court’s decision in Alyeska by 
applying the analysis in Alyeska to the question whether the 
unadorned term “costs” in a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
should be interpreted to include attorneys' fees. The Court in 
Marek explained that the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure were well aware of the American Rule, the ways in 
which Congress had long been making statutory exceptions to 
it, and the varied formulations by which it was done. Id. 
Congress well knew how to explicitly define “costs” to include 
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attorneys’ fees, as it had done with other statutes. Id. at 8–9. 
Thus, when the drafters left the word “costs” in the Rule 68 
undefined, it was “very unlikely that the omission was mere 
oversight.”  Id. at 9. The intention was to maintain that rule’s 
generality and allow Congress to tailor the manner in which the 
rule would apply to various cases through “specific and explicit 
provisions for the allowance of attorneys’ fees.” Alyeska, 421 
U.S. at 260.5  In this way, the drafters left Congress free to 
“pick and choose among its statutes and to allow attorneys’ 
fees under some, but not others.” Id. at 263.  
 
Marek, in addition to reaffirming the American Rule, 
provides a consistent rationale for why the drafters of Rule 
41(d) chose to leave “costs” undefined.  Citigroup’s argument 
that attorneys’ fees should be included within “costs,” and thus 
recoverable under the rule in every case is out of step with the 
policy of allowing the legislature to fine tune the claims for 
which attorneys’ fees may be recovered. Contrary to 
Citigroup’s position, the drafters of Rule 41(d) left the 
definition of costs open-ended in the rule and only by statutory 
authority can it be expanded to include attorneys’ fees. Just as 
the Supreme Court explained in the Rule 68 context, we 
conclude that “the most reasonable inference” is that the term 
“costs” in Rule 41(d) “was intended to refer to all costs 
properly awardable under the relevant substantive statute or 
other authority.”  Marek, 473 U.S. at 9.6  We therefore adopt 
                                                 
5  By 1985, Congress had enacted over 100 attorneys’ fees 
statutes, in many variations. Appendix to Opinion of Brennan, 
J. (Dissenting), Marek, 473 U.S. at 43–50. 
 
6  There is a need to examine closely the underlying 
statutory authority to assess the standards under which 
attorneys’ fees can be awarded. For example, there is the 
traditional asymmetry between prevailing plaintiffs and 
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the Underlying Substantive Statute Interpretation of Rule 41(d) 
and hold that “costs” in Rule 41(d) includes attorneys’ fees 
only “where the underlying statute defines ‘costs’ to include 
attorneys’ fees.”  Id. Because in this case there is no applicable 
underlying substantive statute that defines “costs” as including 
attorneys’ fees, the District Court’s Order denying the award 
of those fees will be affirmed.  
B. Whether Citigroup waived its right for us to 
consider whether it is entitled to attorneys’ 
fees under the bad faith exception to the 
American Rule 
The unavailability of attorneys’ fees under Rule 41(d) 
does not leave a defendant in the position of Citigroup without 
a remedy. District courts have “inherent power” to award 
attorneys’ fees in certain situations, including “when the losing 
party has ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons….’” Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258–59 (quoting 
F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., Inc., 
417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)). A district court under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927 also may order an  
                                                 
prevailing defendants in § 1983 actions. Esposito, 223 F.3d at 
501. That is, while under § 1988, prevailing plaintiffs in § 1983 
actions “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless 
special circumstances would render such an award unjust,” 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) 
(per curiam), prevailing defendants are only entitled to 
attorneys’ fees where the plaintiff’s claim was “frivolous, 
unreasonable, or groundless,” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. 
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978). Thus, a defendant in a § 1983 
action would need to show that the plaintiff’s prior action was 
“frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless” in order to recover 
attorneys’ fees under Rule 41(d).  
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attorney “who so multiplies the proceedings in any case 
unreasonably and vexatiously” to pay a party’s attorneys’ fees. 
28 U.S.C. § 1927.  
 
In the District Court, however, Citigroup moved for 
costs and attorneys’ fees only pursuant to Rule 41(d), and not 
on the basis of bad faith. While during oral argument Citigroup 
represented that it also sought costs and fees in the District 
Court on the basis of bad faith, Tr. of Oral Arg. 31:16–32:4, a 
review of Citigroup’s submissions to that Court with respect to 
its motion for costs and a stay shows that it did not raise that 
argument.  
 
To preserve a matter for appellate review, a party “must 
unequivocally put its position before the trial court at a point 
and in a manner that permits the court to consider its merits.” 
Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 182 F.3d 212, 218 (3d 
Cir. 1999). “It is well established that arguments not raised 
before the District Court are waived on appeal.” DIRECTV, 
Inc. v. Seijas, 508 F.3d 123, 125 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007); John 
Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 
n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) (“arguments raised in passing (such as, in a 
footnote), but not squarely argued, are considered waived”).  A 
review of the record in this case shows that Citigroup did not 
request attorneys’ fees from the District Court based upon the 
District Court’s inherent authority, § 1927, or any other 
exception to the American Rule. In other words, the only issue 
before the District Court that Citigroup properly preserved for 
appeal to this Court was whether Citigroup was entitled to 
attorneys’ fees as “costs” under Rule 41(d).  
 
Even had it preserved the issue in the District Court, 
Citigroup argued for the first time in its reply brief that we 
should remand so the District Court can decide whether the 
Estate's decision to refile amounted to bad faith. Raising an 
issue in a reply brief is too late, for “[a]s a general matter, an 
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appellant waives an argument in support of reversal if it is not 
raised in the opening brief.” In re: Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. 
(No. VI), 873 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing McCray v. 
Fidelity Nat’l Ins. Co., 682 F.3d 229, 241 (3d Cir. 2012)). 
“[W]here an issue is raised for the first time in a reply brief, we 
deem it insufficiently preserved for review before this court.” 
Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 
Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 78 (3d Cir. 1989)).  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Rule 41(d) does not provide a basis for ordering the 
Estate to pay Citigroup’s attorneys’ fees incurred in connection 
with the litigation in the Southern District of New York. It only 
permits a district court to award attorneys’ fees as costs when 
the underlying statute defines costs to include attorneys’ fees, 
and the underlying statute here did not do so. Citigroup also 
did not properly raise any applicable exception to the American 
Rule by which the District Court could order the Estate to pay 
its attorneys’ fees. Thus, the Order of the District Court 
denying Citigroup’s request for those fees will be affirmed. 
